In this paper, I build a model of family labor supply and residential choices that explicitly incorporates the full-time or part-time work decisions of married women. The model is able to explain why women's participation patterns in full-time and part-time work vary significantly in areas that are geographically close but differ in real estate prices. The model suggests that high commuting costs could be one of the main obstacles for women's full-time employment in places like the Tokyo Metropolitan Area.
Introduction
How is women's employment related to the geographical distribution of households? The present paper explores this question in a specific context: the Tokyo Metropolitan Area in Japan. I present an optimizing model of family labor supply and residential choices that incorporates an important institutional feature of the Japanese labor market: the decision of women to work full-time or part-time. The Tokyo Metropolitan Area is also unique in that real estate prices rise sharply for locations close to the Central Business District (CBD). Costa and Kahn (2000) show that highly educated "power couples" in the United States became more likely to locate in the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) from 1940 to 1990. They attribute this change to the colocation problem, i.e., the difficulty of finding a residence convenient to both spouses' workplaces. In contrast, Compton and Pollak (2007) analyze panel data and show that power couples are no more likely than other types to migrate to large metropolitan areas. Accordingly, they argue that colocation is not a major cause for the concentration of power couples in large MSAs.
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Neither of these studies, however, are not very explicit about the relationship between residential decisions and housing prices.
Several studies have investigated the relationship between women's work and housing purchases. Yoshikawa and Ohtake (1989) , Fortin (1995) , and Del Boca and Lusardi (2003) empirically examine how married women's work is related to the housing purchases of their households. In the regional science literature, Mok (2007) asks whether incomes of the two spouses are pooled or not in deciding the location of housing. Using the Canadian Census data of the Toronto Metropolitan Area, she finds that incomes are not pooled for couples without children. Iwata and Tamada (2008) build a model of commuting behaviors of married women and argue for a non-monotonic relationship between the working married women's wage rate and commuting time. Sakanishi (2007) builds a model in which the location of the household is determined by husband's choice and the wife chooses her employment status given the husband's location.
In this paper I present a model of family labor supply that permits married women to choose from either full-time or part-time job opportunities. The commuting costs, wage levels, and working hours for the two employment options are explicitly modeled so as to reflect the real constraints faced by couples in Japan. The model explains why the distribution of women's employment status differs significantly across prefectures in the Tokyo Metropolitan area.
The paper makes two novel contributions to the literature. First, it explicitly considers the optimization over married women's work (either full-time or part-time) and residential location. In modeling this, the "discreteness" of these two choices are particularly emphasized. This element of the model is especially relevant in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area, where full-time work is more common among women living close to the CBD than among women living in the suburbs. Such regional differences in participation are not observed for men (see Section 2). By modeling the family's housing location and labor supply decisions simultaneously, this model provides a natural explanation for such patterns.
Second, the paper illuminates the importance of commuting costs in understanding women's work in Japan. Several important measures (legal and otherwise) to promote women's participation in the workplace have been adopted in Japan in recent decades (e.g., the Equal Employment Opportunity Law, the Maternity Leave Law, and various policies to make balancing work and family easier). Nonetheless, the proportion of women working in regular full-time jobs in Japan has not increased much, especially after age 40. Most of the increase in women's employment after middle age has taken the form of non-regular, part-time work (Abe 2009 ). Commuting costs (including the time and energy necessary for commuting) have not fallen much for female workers in the past several decades, however, which may explain the sluggish advancement in women's regular, full-time employment.
The unique aspect of my model is that it explicitly incorporates the discrete feature of the labor market. In Japan, full-time wages are much higher than part-time wages. Furthermore, it is difficult for women who left the labor force at childbearing age to return to regular employment (Ueda 2007) .
These factors make full-time work and part-time work very different, and the "middle" of these two is almost nonexistent. I argue in this paper that the housing market operates in a way to further strengthen this discrete feature in the labor market.
The property that high wage workers live close to the CBD while low wage workers live farther from the CBD is common in many monocentric model; it applies to both men and women. Yet, the distance from the CBD creates larger differences on women's behavior than for men's. The large discrepancy in women's behavior is caused by the discreteness in the labor market, magnified by the housing market.
Discreteness in the labor market may sometimes be mitigated by other "markets." For instance, if the full-time wage is higher than the part-time wage, in a multi-period setting full-time workers retire early but part-time workers retire late. Then, the lifetime earnings from the two employment statuses are more equalized than single period earnings, implying that intertemporal substitution mitigates discreteness in a single period. What is unique about the housing market in this paper is that it operates to magnify the discreteness in the labor market. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents stylized facts on regional differences in participation in the labor market. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 provides a numerical example of the model. Section 5 concludes.
Stylized Facts
This section describes regional patterns of labor force behavior in Japan to motivate subsequent analysis. In the following discussion, three measures of participation are used: the employment-to-population ratio (E-P ratio), the regular employment ratio, and the part-time employment ratio. The regular employment ratio is the number of regular employees divided by population, in which regular employees include "regular" wage and salary earners as well as executives of private corporations. The part-time employment ratio is the number of part-time and arbeit employees divided by population.
Participation in full-
2 Part-time and arbeit employees 2 In the data used in this subsection, "part-time" and "arbeit" are the terms for employment status in the workplace. Both part-time and arbeit employees are non-regular workers. There is no clear distinction in tasks and working conditions for the two types of workers, although arbeit workers are generally younger than part-time workers. Students who work part time normally work under arbeit status. 4 The data show several interesting patterns. First, the E-P ratio for women below age 40 is higher in Tokyo than in the three other suburban prefectures. This ratio is similar in all four prefectures after age 40. The types of women's employment observed in the four regions are quite different: regular employment is more common in Tokyo, while part-time employment is more common in the other three prefectures, independent of age. Second, the E-P ratio and the regular employment ratio of men do not differ much across the four prefectures. If anything, the regular employment ratio of men is slightly lower in Tokyo than elsewhere. Overall, the regional differences in women's employment are clearly larger. 5 It is natural to expect that these significant differences are caused by endogenous choice of residential location. Housing prices are higher in Tokyo, and full-time employees earn much more than part-time employees. On the other hand, full-time jobs carry less flexible work schedules. High earnings from full-time working wives may be used to finance the high cost of housing close to the CBD.
Households in which the wife does not work full time will locate farther from the CBD, so as to spend less for housing.
Educational composition and labor supply choices across prefectures
Most large-scale datasets on Japanese workers do not contain information on both wage and place of residence, so the hypothesis laid out in the previous section is difficult to be tested directly. 6 In this section, I therefore use education as a proxy for wage level. It is well known that education is highly 5 More generally, it is known that women's participation in the labor market, especially with respect to regular, full-time work, has significant regional variations within Japan (Takeishi 2007; Abe et al. 2008) . Regional variations are small for men.
6 Surveys carried out at employers' establishments do not usually include information on the workers' places of residence. At the time of writing, it is also difficult to obtain hourly wage information from large-scale household surveys in Japan, because microdata samples obtained for research purposes from those surveys deliberately omit prefecture codes for confidentiality reasons.
correlated with full-time wages. I first look at the proportion of educated people among residents, and then look at proportion of educated workers among residents.
7 Figure 2 shows the proportion of people with more than a university education (16 years or more) among residents in the four prefectures, separately by age group. Among both men and women of all age groups, the proportion of highly educated persons ("power" individuals) is highest in Tokyo. The second educated prefecture is Kanagawa, followed by Chiba and Saitama.
These data support the idea that high-wage people tend to live closer to the CBD of Tokyo.
The educational distribution does not show whether labor supply is related to residential choice, because the population considered includes both workers and non-workers.
8 To see the distribution of "power workers," the proportion of those with more than a university degree and working (power working men and women) among residents are plotted in Figure 3 . For both men and women, the proportion of power workers is highest in Tokyo. The pattern in Figure 3 basically mirrors the educational distribution (Figure 2 ), so it may be concluded that labor supply choices do not have a large impact on the geographical distribution of power working men and women; the 7 Costa and Kahn (2000) define "power couples" as couples in which both spouses have more than a college degree. The available data do not allow me to investigate the combination of educational attainment of husband and wife. In this paper, "power" men and women are those who have at least a university degree, and "power working" men and women are those who have at least a university degree and work.
8 In Japan, the labor force participation rate of highly educated women is not much higher than that of less educated women.
effects of education is more significant.
Housing price, educational composition, and labor supply
More evidence on educational attainment and labor supply choices of residents is provided by aggregate data from the 2000 Census. Census data are available at the municipal level: here, I focus on cities in the Tokyo prefecture.
9 The Census data on educational attainment and labor supply can be matched with housing price data. Table 1 . Land prices have a positive impact on the proportion of power working men and women: a 10 percent increase in price is associated with a 1-2 percent increase in the dependent variable. The coefficients are larger for men than for women.
The aggregate municipal data are available only for municipalities with population of more than 0.5 million. There are 8 such municipalities in the Tokyo prefecture.
10 Causality should not be inferred, as this pattern of the distribution of power working I also run regressions in which the dependent variable is the labor force participation rate and the independent variables are the log housing price and age dummies. The results are shown in Table 2 . Among men and highly educated women, the housing prices do not affect participation: therefore, labor supply choices of these people do not differ across regions, which is consistent with the observation that the distributions of power working men and women is similar to the distributions of power men and women. Among women with a senior high school degree, those who live in expensive areas are more likely to participate in the labor market.
Model
I now present a model of family labor supply that explains the regional differences presented in Section 2.
Households
Consider a household with two adult members, a husband and a wife. The family utility is defined as U (l h , l w , C), where l h is the husband's leisure time, l w is the wife's leisure time, and C is the value of consumption other than housing. In the rest of this paper, the first derivative of U (.) with respect to spouse j's leisure is denoted as U j , j = h, w, and the first derivative with men and women is consistent with several other explanations. For example, highly educated people prefer to live in areas where school quality is high, and school quality and housing price are positively correlated.
respect to C is denoted as U C . 
Note that there is a "jump" in the earnings function at point θ. This is natural in the context of the Japanese labor market, where the hourly wage rate of female full-time employees is about 30 percent higher than the wage rate of female part-time employees.
The time endowment of both husband and wife is L, and their time constraints give
where h j is spouse j's working hours, D is the commuting time if they commute to the CBD, and I(.) is an indicator function that takes value 1 if the relation inside the parentheses is true and zero otherwise. For simplicity, all housing units are assumed to be the same size, and the incomes of the husband and wife are assumed to be pooled.
There are four possible solutions to the optimization problem described above: (1) In order to derive the optimal location and labor supply choice, two subproblems (the part-time sub-problem and the full-time sub-problem) are defined, and the bid-rent function for housing is derived for each. 11 The bid-11 The derivation in this section follows that in Fujita (1989) .
rent function of the part-time sub-problem is derived by solving the following problem:
M ax
subject to
where u is the utility level of the household. The maximand of this problem
gives the bid-rent function for the part-time sub-problem, denoted ψ P (D).
Likewise, the bid-rent function for the full-time sub-problem is derived by solving the following:
The maximand of this problem gives the bid-rent function for the full-time
LetC(l h , l w , u) represent the consumption level that achieves utility level u when the husband's leisure is l h and the wife's leisure is l w . The first-order condition with respect to h h is the same for the two sub-problems, and is expressed as follows:
The first-order condition with respect to h w in the full-time sub-problem is:
in which the inequality holds when h w = θ.
The first-order condition with respect to h w in the part-time sub-problem is as follows:
where the character inside the square brackets indicates one of the four states.
The following two conditions are met at the corner solution of h w = θ:
The will be a range of W P and W F for which the wife's working hours are set to θ (part-time work) and do not increase even if W P rises. That is, the wife works as many hours as possible while remaining part-time. If
/∂l w , then the wife would like to work more than θ hours but the commute prevents her from pursuing full-time employment opportunities. In this range, an increase in W P does not result in longer part-time hours; thus, the wage elasticity of working hours is zero. It is hard for the wife to take on a full-time job if the commuting cost is high, even though her opportunity cost of leisure is not high (in the sense that she is willing to work more than θ hours).
The derivative of the bid-rent function is the time cost of commuting, implying ∂ψ
This is the familiar Alonso-Mills-Muth (AMM) condition. 13 The transportation cost per hour is the opportunity cost of working and is equal to the hourly wage rate of full-time workers who commute to the CBD.
Then, for some households
To understand the implication of Assumption 1, suppose a household is located at D. ∆C is the compensation necessary for the wife to work θ hours as a full-time worker (commute D hours), and to keep the household equally well-off when she is at the part-time status and work θ hours. Assumption 1 says that for some households, the part-time/full-time wage gap is not so large as to compensate for the wife's commute of D hours.
Proposition 1. For all households,
ψ P (0, u) < ψ F (0, u).
For households in which Assumption 1 holds,
13 Alonso (1964 ), Mills (1967 , and Muth (1969) .
The bid-rent function of a household is
Proof. When D = 0, the maximization problem for deriving the bid-rent functions for part-time status and full-time status differ only in the level of wife's wage (whether it is W P or W F ). Since W F > W P , it is obvious that
The bid-rent functions at location D are as follows:
Since h P w is chosen optimally, ψ P (D, u) is higher than when h P w is set equal to θ in the RHS of Eq. (10) and thus:
Using Eq. (11),
The last equality follows becausẽ
and
Then the last expression of Eq. (12) becomes
Using Eq. (14), Eq. (13) 
The maximum of ψ P (D, u) and ψ F (D, u), ψ(D, u) , gives the bid-rent function for a household when the wife has options to work either full time or part time.
For households for which Assumption 1 holds, ψ P (D) > ψ F (D) and u) , and therefore, ψ P (.) and ψ F (.) intersects once. 14 While
for all, in no households the wife works part time. Since part-time work has become increasingly common in Japan in recent decades, it is natural to expect that this type of assumption holds.
Definition 1 (Reservation wage for part-time work). The wife's reservation
wage for part-time work, w * P , satisfies the following condition:
The reservation wage for part-time work (measured in consumption goods)
is similar to the standard reservation wage concept determining working or not working.
Definition 2 (Reservation wage for full-time work). The wife's reservation wage for full-time work
The four modes of work are illustrated in Figure 4 when the utility func-
The horizontal axis represents the wife's leisure time (l w ), while the vertical axis measures the marginal utility of her leisure (∂u w /∂l w ). The following proposition gives an interesting property of the above model.
Proposition 2. Assume the utility function is concave, and is separable
between l h and C and between l w and C. Assume further that U wh ≤ 0.
Proof. By the definition of the reservation wage for the wife's full-time work and by the relation satisfied on the indifference surface,
Differentiating Eq. (15) with respect to D and U jC = 0 (j = h, w) because of separability, I obtain
and U wh ≤ 0 by assumption, it follows that
Proposition 2 says that when each spouse's leisure and consumption is separable and U wh ≤ 0, locating closer to the CBD reduces the wife's reservation wage for full-time work. On the other hand, as shown in Proposition 2, it is easier for wives located close to the CBD for other reasons to participate in full-time work.
Once the wife participate as a full-time worker, a higher W F increases her full-time hours. This serves to reinforce the discrete nature of the labor market because the earnings differential between full-time working women 15 The assumption that U wh ≤ 0 is likely to hold if household responsibilities are shared by both spouses. and others widens. This point is summarized in the following lemma. 
Proof. When the wife works full time, the bid-rent gradient equals the summed wages of husband and wife. −∂ψ Note that a high W F has two reinforcing impacts on h w . First, a higher wage decreases the amount of leisure, as in the standard labor supply model.
Its another impact is to reduce D, locating closer to the CBD. A lower value of
D allows a full-time working wife to increase h w further. A similar argument applies to the husband's hours, h h .
between the husband's wage and the wife's full-time wage, as well as the correlation between the husband's wage and the likelihood that the wife works full time. 16 An implication is that the housing units located close to the CBD are more likely to be occupied by two-earner households.
A numerical example
This section presents a numerical example of the above model. The utility function is assumed to be the following form:
I assume α < β=0.6. The full-time wages of husbands and wives, W h and W F , are assumed to follow a uniform distribution: W h has a uniform distribution over the interval [1, 4] , and W F has a uniform distribution over the interval [0.5,1.5]. Note that the mean full-time wage is higher for males than for females, and that the variance of full-time wage is larger for males than for females. It is assumed that the wife's part-time wage, W P , is correlated with W F as follows:
16 Empirical studies in Japan to date have not reached a consensus regarding the sign of the correlation between the husband's wage and the wife's labor force participation. In the past this correlation was thought to be negative, and some studies using recent data still find a negative correlation (e.g., Sasaki 2002; Nawata and Ii 2004) . However, other studies point out the possibility that this correlation has become weaker over time, and may even have turned positive (e.g., Kohara 2008) .
For wives whose full-time wages are lower than the 25th percentile of the full- 18 17 An example with simple assortative matching between spouses is also constructed, but the results are not reported here. The properties of the solution are essentially the same.
18 In a more fundamental sense, this relationship should be derived by solving for the Although the example here is quite specific in that full-time wages are assumed to follow a uniform distribution and matching between husband and wife is random, it is consistent with the empirical features of the education and housing location distributions (Figures 2 and 3 ). Share of residents with a university degree or more by Prefecture: Men 37 
Conclusions

